Justin Thaler, a cryptography research partner at venture capital firm a16z and an associate professor in the Department of Computer Science at Georgetown University, appealed to the cryptocurrency industry to resist panic over the threat of quantum computing.
Research partners argue that timelines for cryptographically relevant quantum computers remain a long way off, and that a premature transition to post-quantum cryptography may pose more immediate risks than the theoretical perils themselves.
Is blockchain currently facing a quantum threat?
in Detailed blog post It was also shared by X, but Thaler took issue with what he said were often exaggerated predictions about quantum computing power.
He defined quantum computers in the context of cryptography as fault-tolerant machines that can crack the secp256k1 elliptic curve, or RSA-2048, encryption used in Bitcoin and Ethereum within about a month.
“From any reasonable reading of published milestones and resource estimates, we are far from a cryptographically adequate quantum computer,” Thaler wrote.
Thaler assessed that such breakthroughs are highly unlikely in the 2020s, based on publicly available milestones, and pointed to the U.S. government’s 2035 goal of widespread post-quantum cryptography in the federal system as a more reasonable planning horizon.
However, he said, “This is not a prediction that there will be cryptographically relevant quantum computers by then.”
The a16z position distinguishes between different categories of cryptographic systems and their respective vulnerabilities.
Saylor acknowledged that post-quantum encryption requires immediate adoption due to Harvest Now Decrypt Later (HNDL) attacks already underway, but said there is no such risk with the digital signatures used by Bitcoin and Ethereum because blockchain data is inherently public.
He said zero-knowledge proofs generated before quantum computers would still be reliable.
What are blockchain stakeholders doing about quantum threats?
While Thaler offers input on what stakeholders should prioritize, those in the blockchain space are gearing up for the post-quantum phase. Ethereum Foundation Announcing the newly formed post-quantum team.
coinbase We have also established an independent advisory board on quantum computing and blockchain. The board is made up of industry experts and researchers, including Justin Drake from the Ethereum Foundation.
This board is tasked with assessing the impact of quantum computing on the blockchain ecosystem and providing clear and independent guidance to the broader community.
Franklin Bi, general partner at Pantera Capital, reacted to the Ethereum Foundation’s PQ team’s announcement, stating that blockchain systems may be better prepared for the adoption and adaptation of the post-quantum phase compared to traditional financial institutions on Wall Street.
he wrote“People are overestimating how quickly Wall Street will adapt to post-quantum cryptography. Like any system software upgrade, it will be slow and chaotic with single points of failure for years. Traditional systems are only as strong as their weakest link.”
In making the case for blockchain, he said, “Likewise, people underestimate blockchain’s unique ability to perform system-wide software upgrades on a global scale,” adding that if done well and in a timely manner, blockchain networks can evolve into a “safe haven” for post-quantum data and assets.
What does Thaler recommend?
Thaler left a recommendation that all stakeholders, businesses, governments and policymakers should “take the quantum threat seriously,” but added that “we should not operate on the assumption that quantum computers associated with cryptography will be here by 2030.”
He said stakeholders should adopt hybrid encryption immediately, especially in places where long-term confidentiality is important and the cost is acceptable. Thaler also wrote, “Blockchain doesn’t need to rush post-quantum signatures, but we need to start planning now.”
For privacy chains that encrypt or hide transaction details, faster migration should be prioritized if performance is acceptable, Saylor said.
Another point he reiterated was that stakeholders should prioritize implementation security, not quantum threat mitigation, in the short term. As he calls for more funding for quantum computing development, he is trying to get people to treat new information as a progress report to critically evaluate, rather than as a sudden call to action for now.
Saylor acknowledged that there are innovations and developments that could shorten the schedule, but said there could also be bottlenecks that could push the schedule forward.
